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Abstract  
 
Human consumption of meat, specifically ruminants, is argued to be one of the 
major drivers of climate change. Individual and societal behavioural changes are 
considered necessary to tackle the overconsumption of animal products. This, in 
turn, requires a greater level of support for state interventions and acceptability 
of climate diet policies that aim to change people’s daily dietary patterns. For a 
policy to be acceptable by the public, political trust is one of the essentials to be 
ensured. The lack of confidence in politics is considered to have a negative 
influence on public attitudes towards environmental interventions. In contrast, 
high trust in politics is argued to have a positive impact on public attitudes 
towards environmental policies. 
 
Scholars have devoted substantial attention in recent years to the concept of 
political trust around the acceptability of policies, mostly in the energy and 
transportation sector. However, insufficient attention has been directed to the 
food sector that contributes up to 30% of total greenhouse gas emissions. In this 
study, I introduce a new policy type for the regulation of human’s dietary pattern 
where there are few studies. Hence, I tested the role of political trust on policy 
acceptability and public support for a climate tax levied on meat consumption by 
using an experimental method in Turkey and Sweden. The following survey 
experiment showed that higher political trust caused higher policy acceptability 
and public support for this specific proposal in both countries. This study 
contributes to the understanding of the role of political trust on public attitudes 
towards the regulation of meat consumption. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Leaving climate change unrestrained arguably has dire effects on the planet and 
the human way of living. In some cases, these effects might be difficult to revert 
unless we see a drastic cut in greenhouse gas emissions (IPCC, 2018). One 
contributor to emissions that has been discussed less than other sectors is food 
production, even though it is responsible for approximately 26% of global GHG 
emissions (Poore & Nemecek, 2018). To take urgent climate action, many 
reports, most recently the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 
(2019) clearly articulates the need to change the types of food we grow and 
consume. One of the clear messages in the report is that balanced diets, featuring 
plant-based foods present major opportunities for adaptation and mitigation 
(IPCC, 2019). However, based on the social dilemma theory, people might not 
be willing to make voluntary changes in their dietary patterns. Hence, the short-
term self-benefits of continuing to eat certain foods conflict with long-term 
collective interests. To generate collective action, the presence of state 
intervention might be an essential factor (Jagers et al., 2019; Mansbridge, 2014). 
 
It has been discussed that this kind of state interventions need support from the 
public to be successfully. For instance, Kallbekken & Aasen (2010) stated that 
although environmental taxes as a tool adopted by a third party (state) might be 
efficient, plans to impose new taxes are often met with fierce public resistance. 
Many studies argued that public support for state intervention is influenced by 
public trust in governmental institutions. Some studies stated that citizens are 
more willing to voluntarily comply with or even support government demands 
and regulations when they perceive the government to be trustworthy (Levi, 
1997; Tyler, 2006). Svallfors (2002) examined the relationship between 
institutional trust and state intervention. He found that political trust matters for 
attitudes towards state interventions in Sweden. In the US, trust in government is 
also found to matter for public approval of climate policies (O'Connor et al., 
1999). …………………… 
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Harring (2014) also argued that unless there is a rule-based, trustworthy public 
administration in place, people will not support the implementation of taxes 
despite their strong pro-environmental beliefs. For instance, even though one has 
green values, she/he might be reluctant to support and accept the policy because 
of a lack of trust in politics or politicians. ………………………………………… 
 
As we can see above, political trust is found to stimulate public support. 
Moreover, political distrust is also discussed to stimulate negative evaluation of 
government institutions and reduces public support for government actions 
(Chanley et al., 2000; Hetherington, 1998). For example, in Turkey, a lack of trust 
in the institutional body – whether a national or international one – has been 
reported to have a negative influence on willingness to pay for emissions 
reductions (Adaman et al., 2011). 
 
Much scholarly attention in the literature has been paid to political trust around 
public support for the interventions in the transportation sector such as carbon 
taxes (Adaman et al., 2011; O'Connor et al., 1999; Levi, 1997; Tyler, 2006). The 
food sector, specifically the livestock industry, is almost forgotten regardless of 
its massive impact on climate change. Therefore, studies on the relationship 
between political trust and public support for climate diet policies remained 
scarce. Besides, the most common research method in the literature so far is the 
cross-sectional survey method. However, this method fails to demonstrate a cause 
and effect relationship. This thesis intends to fill these two gaps in the literature 
by 1) measuring the effect of political trust in a new policy field for regulations 
of animal consumption where there are very few studies, and by 2) testing the 
causal relationship between political trust and public support for a climate tax 
with a proper experimental design. 
 
Besides, previous studies mostly used samples from only one country. I will 
conduct the experiment in two rather different countries regarding their 
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corruption levels. Corruption level affects political trust, because trust and 
corruption are likely to reinforce each other, while mistrust and corruption are 
also likely to do so (Uslaner, 2018). …………………………………………… 
 
By taking this into consideration, Sweden and Turkey were chosen to show 
whether the findings will be similar in both countries regardless of their 
corruption levels. According to the Corruption Perception Index 2019 of 
Transparency International (CPI 2019, 2020), while Sweden’s corruption score 
is 85, Turkey’s corruption score is 39. In other words, they stand in two opposite 
direction of the scale. ……………………………………………………………. 
 
Based on the findings above, I intend to answer the question below: 
 
What is the effect of political trust on policy acceptability and public support for 
a hypothetical tax levied on meat consumption in Turkey and Sweden? 
 
The structure of the thesis follows as; the literature review where I will introduce 
the findings on political trust and previous research on policy acceptability, 
acceptance and public support for environmental policy interventions. After the 
literature review, I will bring forward my theoretical framework and hypothesis. 
Objectives and contributions of the thesis will follow. Then I will present the 
methodology part by covering operationalisation of the concepts, research design, 
data collection and experiment standards and validity. Before I conclude my 
research with data analysis results, discussion and conclusion, I will also mention 
the limitations of the study. 
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2. Literature Review 
 
In this chapter, first, I present the literature review on political trust. Second, I 
introduce the previous findings on policy acceptability, acceptance and public 
support for the environmental policy interventions while identifying the research 
gap I intend to fill. 
  
2.1. The role of political trust on public attitudes towards environmental 
interventions  
 
Political trust has positive effects on public support for environmental taxes 
(Davidovic et al., 2019; Hammar & Jagers, 2006). Hammar & Jagers (2006) have 
found that to receive public support for an increase of carbon taxes in Sweden, 
trust in politicians is the most significant factor, and the people who have high 
confidence in politicians are more likely to support it. Similarly, Adaman et al. 
(2011) have stated that trust in institutions as the responsible body for the 
implementation of the policy to reduce CO2 emission was a significant parameter 
in his study conducted in Turkey. The study pointed out that the distrust in 
national or international institutions in Turkey is arising from the perceived level 
of corruption and the Turkish state’s poor governance. So, they have suggested 
that trust-building actions need to be adopted to lead people to trust in institutions 
in Turkey. In another similar study, Zhang et al. (2019) found that to increase the 
public willingness to pay for sand and dust mitigation in Beijing, transparency of 
environmental governance is required. To sum up, trust in politics has been 
argued to be an essential correlate of greater willingness to pay for environmental 
protection (Bakaki & Bernauer, 2017; Fairbrother, 2016). 
 
In a similar way, Zahran et al. (2006) found that trust in governments matters for 
public approval of various climate policies in the US. Moreover, Thaker et al. 
(2019) found that, in India, individuals who have a high level of trust in the 
government are more likely to support government water conservation policies. 
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As it is shown above, people are more likely to accept policies if they trust the 
governing institution (Keramitsoglou & Tsagarakis, 2013; Vaske et al., 2007) 
while a lack of trust has been observed to be accompanied by lower levels of 
willingness to pay for the environmental policies (Adaman et al., 2011). 
Likewise, Marien & Hooghe (2011) suggested that a low level of political trust 
is associated with less support for law compliance within a society. Thus, low 
trust in institutions results in the public to oppose decisions made by those 
institutions. Therefore, a low level of political trust can undermine the effective 
governing of society and effective implementation of policies. 
 
Besides the effective implementation of policies by the government, Bicket & 
Vanner, (2016) argued that governmental institution’s transparency is another 
component between political trust and public acceptability of the policies. 
Policies that are perceived to have ulterior motives will lower public acceptability 
(Bicket & Vanner, 2006). For instance, strong public distrust about the 
effectiveness of a road user charge in Edinburgh coincided with its referendum 
failing to reach a majority of support (Gaunt et al., 2007).  
 
Apart from political trust, there are other explanatory factors behind public 
support for environmental interventions. These are social-psychological factors 
and climate change perception as well as the perception of climate policy and its 
design (Drews & Bergh, 2015). Much has been written about the impact of social-
psychological factors on public support. Ideology, values, religiosity, norms, 
believes, environmental concern or different worldviews are some of them. For 
instance, Davidovic et al. (2019) in their study about the link between 
environmental concern, ideology and quality of government found that people 
with pro-environmental and leftist value orientations are supportive of 
environmental taxes. However, they are even more eager not to support and 
provide corrupt, inefficient, and untrustworthy public institutions with additional 
financial resources. In the end, revenues of the taxes may end up being used for 
environmentally detrimental rather than environmentally protective purposes. In 
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another study, it has been argued that the fact that owning strong green 
sympathies and concerns is no guarantee that people will be willing to accept 
political initiatives that are aimed at improving the environmental conditions 
(Harring & Jagers, 2013).  
 
Except for the social-psychological factors, public attitudes are also argued to be 
influenced by the perception of climate policy and its design (Drews & Bergh, 
2015). For example, a study conducted in Turkey, Gevrek & Uyduranoglu (2015) 
stated that earmarking carbon tax revenues increase the public acceptability of 
the tax. Even though the design of the policy matters, without political trust, 
public support for the policy might be still hard to achieve. For instance, when 
there is a lack of political trust, citizens would not know how the revenues will 
be redistributed; in turn, they might not be eager to support a costly policy. 
Because, trust in political institutions, including trust in the political system and 
that those responsible for managing tax revenues (politicians) in an effective and 
uncorrupted manner, will influence acceptance (Kallbekken & Sælen, 2011; 
Harring, 2014). Besides, Kallbekken & Sælen (2011) found a strong link between 
the earmarking the revenues and popularity of environmental taxes and that the 
critical reason for the strong support for earmarking might be public distrust in 
government.  
 
A similar finding has been made by Dresner et al. (2006) as well. They found that 
the problem that environmental tax reform faces in terms of public acceptance 
was not so much outright hostility to environmental taxation as conceptual 
problems with the design. For most people, the difficulty appeared primarily to 
be that they did not trust politicians to do what they promised with the money 
(Dresner et al., 2006). Thus, people are likely to be reluctant to contribute and 
protest even more against the state interventions for environmental purposes 
when there is a lack of trust in the institution’s ability, willingness and capacity 
to manage the funds properly (Wiser, 2007). The studies on the role of political 
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trust on public attitudes have put a high degree of effort into how political trust 
might be affected, or affecting to, by other factors or conditions. 
 
Consequentially, much of the growing research on political trust argues that 
political trust is both cause and consequence of corruption (Morris & Klesner, 
2010). According to Della Porta (2000), the lack of confidence in government 
actually favours corruption. Rather than seeing a low level of trust as causing 
corruption, some other approaches envision corruption as eroding the level of 
trust (Anderson & Tverdova, 2003; Chang & Chu, 2006). As we can see here, 
even though there are ongoing discussions about the direction of the relationship 
between political trust and corruption, the strong correlation between them has 
been accepted by many studies. For instance, Harring (2013) stated that political 
trust, corruption and economic sacrifices are very much integrated. Corruption 
generates less economic development and environmental degradation, and people 
are more likely to be hostile toward making financial sacrifices if they live in poor 
societies or have low incomes, and also if they do not trust their political 
institutions. For instance, corruption misuses state resources or channelise the 
available resources unproportionally, so that essential services are provided at 
poorer levels. All these lead citizens to develop negative orientations towards 
political institutions and lower their trust in politics. Thus, they withdraw their 
support from corrupt institutions and politicians, which gives way for more 
corruption.  
 
In other words, since corruption causes lower political trust, people might be 
sceptical for making economic sacrifices that government enforces. For instance, 
Gevrek & Uyduranoglu (2015) showed that the acceptability of a tax proposal 
decreases when the personal financial sacrifices caused by the proposal increases 
in Turkey. More studies pointed out that the political feasibility of policy 
interventions depends on citizens’ perception of policy-induced costs and 
benefits (Bernauer, 2013; Carattini et al., 2018; Drews & Bergh, 2015; Fesenfeld 
et al., 2020).  Based on the findings, it is proven that there is an absolute bond 
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between political trust, corruption and public support for environmental policies. 
Still, the causal relationship between political trust and public support remains 
limited.  
 
In this regard, during the selection of the countries for my thesis, this relationship 
has been taken into account. According to the Corruption Perception Index 2019 
of Transparency International (CPI 2019, 2020), while Sweden’s corruption score 
is 85, Turkey’s corruption score is 39. Besides, in Turkey and Sweden, the level 
of confidence in government is somewhat different. World Values Survey Wave 
6 (Inglehart et al., 2014) shows that, in Sweden, confidence in government was 
50.5% while 34.2% in Turkey. The report of SOM Institute, University of 
Gothenburg, showed that people in Sweden trust Swedish politicians very or 
fairly much (Martinsson & Andersson, 2019). These differences picturing two 
different pictures in each country is significant to show my hypothesis in this 
study.  
 
I have defined political trust in this study as “a vertical sense of confidence in the 
formal, legal organisations of government and state and their capacities to carry 
out policies in an efficient, uncorrupt and fairway” by taking inspiration from 
Uslaner (2018) and Davidovic et al. (2019). Political trust and institutional trust 
have been used interchangeably in this paper. 
 
2.2. Policy acceptability, acceptance and public support for environmental 
interventions 
 
In this section, I shortly introduce the findings on the concepts related to public 
attitudes towards environmental interventions - policy acceptability, acceptance, 
and public support. In addition, I present the scarce literature on distinguishing 
these concepts where the previous literature has often failed to do so (Kyselá et 
al., 2019). 
 
 12 
Overall, for a policy measure to be successfully implemented, there are some 
political hurdles need to be dealt with. For instance, even though environmental 
taxes are proven to be quite efficient and effective when they are implemented, 
public opposition is one of the main obstacles for policymakers to enforce the 
environmental policies (Carattini et al., 2018). In most cases, political feasibility 
comes across challenges stemming from insufficient public acceptance of policy 
interventions. Hence, environmental policy analysts usually anticipate trade-offs 
between problem-solving effectiveness and political feasibility (Fesenfeld et al., 
2020). When designing policy tools, decision-makers continuously face the 
challenge of carefully striking a balance between efficiency and legitimacy 
(Harring & Jagers, 2013). This is why positive public attitudes towards 
environmental interventions – accepting and supporting a policy – are substantial 
elements of the implementation.  
 
As a result of which, policy acceptability, acceptance and public support are 
extensively studied in the literature and argued to be influenced by several factors. 
Political trust, as one of the most influencing factors behind public approaches 
towards environmental interventions, has been presented in the previous section 
in depth. In short, it has been argued to be an essential factor that needs to be 
ensured for a policy to be found acceptable by the public. Other than trust, some 
theories from a socio-psychological perspective, such as the value-belief-norm 
(VBN), assumes that many of the behavioural activities are the result of a causal 
chain that starts with personal values which lead to beliefs and results in 
behaviour (Stern et al., 1999). In addition to that, the perception of climate policy 
and its design has been stated to have a considerable impact on public support for 
environmental policies. For example, Drews & Bergh (2015) argued that people 
are likely to prefer non-coercive climate policies over more coercive policies.  
 
In the literature, policy acceptability, policy acceptance and public support are 
predominantly used as interchangeable concepts but rarely as distinct terms. 
Since the policymakers are supposed to know about and interested in the public 
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attitudes towards a specific policy or a policy instrument, researchers need to be 
clear what they measure and how they interpret the results of their studies. 
Surprisingly, in most of the studies, definitions of these three concepts are rarely 
given, and the difference is rarely indicated. Only a few studies directly compare 
different measures of attitudes to the same policy, and the results of these studies 
indicate essential differences between the measures (Kyselá et al., 2019).  
 
Dreyer & Walker (2013), as one of the few studies mentioned above, asked 
Australians how acceptable they find the Clean Energy Legislative Package 
(responding to a 5-point Likert-type scale) and whether they support this policy 
(binary yes/no response). They found that more Australians were willing to find 
the policy acceptable than unacceptable. In contrast, when they asked about 
support, more Australians tended not to support to policy than support it (Dreyer 
& Walker, 2013). According to the results of the study, policy acceptability and 
public support for the Clean Energy Legislative Package have been evaluated by 
the public differently, and it is unlikely to assume that acceptability of the policy 
predicts the support for the policy. And in a different study, Dreyer et al. (2015), 
employed two various measures on a single transportation regulation policy that 
are acceptance of the policy, and support for the policy and it has been found that 
policy acceptance of the policy is higher compared to the support for it. Bakaki 
& Bernauer (2017) have distinguished willingness to pay (WTP) and willingness 
to support (WTS) and found that WTP for forest conservation in Brazil is lower 
than WTS the policy itself.  
 
To differentiate the concepts, in this thesis, policy acceptability and public 
support are measured in the same policy proposal as different public attitudes 
types. Distinguishing these terms, acceptability, acceptance and support, from 
one another, is crucial for not only theoretical reasons but also practical and 
applied policy reasons (Dreyer et al., 2015). When planning climate policies, 
decision-makers should engage in systematic assessment of both willingness to 
support, and willingness to pay in order to understand constraints emanating from 
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public support for (or opposition to) such policies (Bakaki & Bernauer, 2017). 
There is a possibility that the other studies, where these terms are used 
interchangeable, might have measured acceptance instead of support or support 
instead of acceptability. In this study, by measuring both acceptability and 
support, it will be shown whether the effect of political trust will be the same on 
both public attitudes type or not. 
 
While defining these two concepts in this study, I am inspired by some of the 
existing definitions of policy acceptance, policy acceptability and public support 
(Hassan et al., 2014; Batel et al., 2013; Schade & Schlag, 2003; Kyselá et al., 
2019). I describe policy acceptability as “a passive evaluation before the 
implementation to see the potential to implement a specific policy” while defining 
policy acceptance as “passive evaluative response to an existing policy, after the 
implementation” and public support as “an active behavioural evaluation to an 
existing policy”. Briefly, policy acceptability is a pre-implementation attitude, 
policy acceptance is a post-implementation attitude, and public support is an 
active endorsement of the policy.  
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3. Theoretical framework and the hypothesis  
 
The literature review above shows the interaction between political trust and 
policy acceptability and public support for environmental policies. Based on the 
findings in previous research and theoretical arguments, I expect that level of 
political trust will directly lead to higher or lower acceptability and support for 
the policy proposal to levy a tax on meat consumption. This relationship is 
illustrated in figure 1 below.  
 
Figure 1. Political trust as a determining factor of policy acceptability and 
public support 
 
 
 
  H1a 
 
                        
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                 H1b 
 
 
 
 
Based on the theoretical model, my hypothesis is:  
 
In both countries,  
 
H1a: The higher political trust people have, the more likely they are to support a 
climate tax on meat consumption. 
 
H1b: The higher political trust people have, the more likely they are to accept a 
climate tax on meat consumption. 
  
Political trust 
pPolicy acceptability 
uPublic support 
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4. The objectives and the contributions of the thesis  
 
Taxes are market-based mitigation options to tackle climate change; the purpose 
of this specific proposal is to change human diet patterns to a more sustainable 
one by taxing the meat consumption. There are quite a lot of studies on how to 
gain public support for carbon taxes, how to design energy policies or how to 
redistribute the revenues. However, very few studies exist for the food sector, 
particularly in the context of a concrete behavioural setting such as the daily 
consumption of food products. This thesis contributes to the literature by 
introducing a new policy field that levies a tax on products/food of animal origin.  
Another contribution of this study is the location where the study is conducted. 
Previous studies have mostly studied developed countries with less corrupted 
institutions, less inequality and a high level of political trust. This might have 
caused sample selection bias. This study was practised in a developing, Turkey, 
and developed country, Sweden, at the same time on the same policy proposal to 
see whether the similar findings for both might be achieved. 
 
This study also contributes to measuring the policy acceptability and public 
support separately. Differentiating these two concepts is also a gap in the 
literature since researchers generally use these concepts interchangeable with a 
few clear definitions which might cause some mistakes regarding policy 
implementation and result in unclear/misleading findings. 
 
Lastly, the effect of political trust by using a new and different design from 
previous studies is also tested in this study. Most previous studies have used 
cross-sectional survey data by mostly using samples from only one country. I 
have introduced an experimental design to examine the causal relationship 
between political trust and policy acceptability and public support for a climate 
tax. 
  
 17 
5. Methodology and validity  
 
In this section, I present the operationalisation of the concepts, research design, 
data and experiment standards and validity. 
 
5.1.  Operationalisation of the concepts  
5.1.1.  Dependent Variable 
 
The research method of this study is a survey experiment with two treatment and 
one control group. The dependent variable of this study is policy acceptability 
and public support for a climate tax to mitigate the impact of the livestock 
industry on the environment. The focal relationship regards whether the effect of 
political trust on policy acceptability and public support is the same in two rather 
different countries. To make sure all participants had a basic knowledge of the 
impact of animal production and consumption on the environment, a very brief 
introductory summary was presented: “Animal production is one of the largest 
sources of greenhouse gases emission (GHG) with contributions around 15% of 
all human induced GHG emissions” (FAO, 2018). 
 
Two survey questions have been used to capture policy acceptability and public 
support: 1) to measure policy acceptability: “How acceptable do you find the 
hypothetical policy proposal given above?” by using 5-point Likert Scale with 
responses ranging from completely acceptable, slightly acceptable, neutral, 
slightly unacceptable and completely unacceptable, and 2) to measure public 
support a dichotomous choice question has been directed: “Are you willing to 
bear some costs resulting from the policy to decrease the meat consumption, in 
turn, GHG emission? Would you vote in favour of such a policy?” with a binary 
response option - yes or no. 
 
I have included three socio-demographic variables; education, gender and age. 
Links have been identified between education and policy acceptability/public 
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support (Harring & Jagers, 2017; Gevrek & Uyduranoglu, 2015) and it has been 
shown that higher education may generate increased support for some EPIs. In 
another study conducted in Ukraine, Kucher et al. (2019) found a significant 
effect of age and gender on consumers’ willingness to pay a price premium for 
ecological goods. Level of education was first posed as “What is your education 
level?” It is then coded in four categories, no education, elementary school, high 
school (graduated or current student) and university (graduated or current 
student). Gender is measured with female, male, or other categories. Age was 
recoded into four different categories 18-26 years, 27-49 years, 50-64 years, 65 
or older. 
 
5.1.2.  Independent Variable  
 
Independent variable - treatment - of this study is the political trust which is 
defined “a vertical sense of confidence in the formal, legal organisations of 
government and state and their capacities to carry out policies in an efficient, 
uncorrupt and fairway”. For a study to be an experiment, an independent variable 
must be able to be manipulated, no causation without manipulation (Holland, 
1986).  
 
Trust, especially political trust, is already hard to measure since its definitions 
vary. What is created in participants’ imagination of trust is vital because trust in 
institutions, for instance, is different from the generalised trust, or particularised 
trust is different from political trust. In my study, I will not measure any kind of 
trust but manipulate political trust. Manipulating the political trust might be tricky 
since it might mean trust in “government”, “parliament”, “authorities” or 
“politicians” for example. For this study, political trust is used interchangeably 
with trust in institutions that means a bond of confidence that citizens place in 
institutions’ effectiveness and fairness while implementing a policy. Thus, I 
needed to create some sort of a trust imagination in the participants’ mind that 
will lead them to think about the institutions’ trustworthiness. 
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The participants have been given information about the corruption levels of the 
countries to higher or lower their trust in politics because publicising corruption 
has strong and lasting effects on political trust (Green et al., 2018). It is a 
significant determinant of political trust since a high level of corruption reduces 
citizens’ support and confidence in political institutions (Christopher, 2003; Ares 
& Hernández, 2017). Thus, to manipulate the political trust negatively and 
positively, I used the facts about the corruption levels of both countries taken 
from Transparency International yearly reports with the support of an illustration 
I have prepared.  
 
5.2.  Research Design: Survey Experiment  
 
For many research questions, experiments are simply the most effective means 
of evaluating competing causal hypotheses. There simply are no statistical 
techniques for observational data that provide the power and elegance of an 
experimental design (Mutz, 2011, p. 14). Increasingly, political scientists rely on 
survey experiments to test for attitude change, the effects of framing, or to use 
priming to clarify cognitive differences among subjects (Wilson & Eckel, 2017).  
 
For one variable to be said to “cause” another, three conditions, the “holy trinity” 
of causality, generally must be met: 1) the two must co-vary, whether overtime 
or across units of analysis; 2) the cause must precede the effect in time; 3) the 
relationship between the cause and effect must not be explainable through some 
other third variable, which would render the association spurious (Mutz, 2011, p. 
9). Two important features of the experiment are to be controlled by the 
researcher and having the random assignment over the treatments to eliminate the 
problem of spurious relationship. 
 
These sorts of experiments need not rely on nationally representative population 
samples. The population of interests might be anyone from any group in society. 
And the ability to make reliable causal inferences has little to do with the 
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laboratory setting, but a lot with moving the possibilities for experimentation 
outside of the laboratory. In this way, experiments strengthen the internal validity 
of social science research and provide the potential to interest a much broader 
group of social scientists in the possibilities of experimentation (Mutz, 2011).  
 
For Mutz (2011), most laboratory experiments rely on undergraduate subject 
pools created for the purpose of providing an ongoing supply of experimental 
subjects for studies, however, with carrying survey experiments to the outside of 
the laboratory, researchers, by selecting the respondents randomly and assigning 
the treatments randomly, achieve a critical advantage which is to collect more 
diverse and authentic, from the real-life, samples. Laboratory settings are often 
assumed to make people act more responsible than they would other-wise be 
because of the close supervision of the experimenter. People know when they are 
being watched and may respond differently as a result (Mutz, 2011, p.12). This 
is not an issue in my survey experiment since I conducted it outside of a 
laboratory.  
 
The primary data for my research is collected via phone calls and spreading online 
surveys on the internet. For the creation of the online survey, Google Survey 
Software has been used. I have assigned my subjects to different experiment 
groups randomly by using a between-group design in which different subjects are 
randomly assigned to groups that receive different experimental treatment. A 
careful manipulation achieves internal validity in my research, a focus on the 
mechanism, and randomisation, which allow researchers to make specific and 
unbiased causal claims and eliminate the problem of spurious relationship.  
 
In the experiment, I followed the single-blind experiment method where 
information that could introduce bias or otherwise skew the result is withheld 
from the participants. Still, the experimenter is in full possession of the facts. So, 
the participants were unaware of condition assignments, and they did not know 
that they were so-called “test” subjects or members of an experiment. However, 
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they were aware that they were taking part in a survey and that their answer and 
their identity are going to stay anonymous. As any experiment requires, I, of 
course, gave them manipulations however none of the information provided was 
false. The positive or negative treatments and a brief informational text were 
given to the experimental groups in both countries. All groups, including the 
control groups, have received the policy suggestion. In order to observe the effect 
of the independent variable (political trust) on the dependent variable (policy 
acceptability/public support), the control group has not received any 
manipulation and information (see figure 2).  
 
Figure 2. 
 Group 1  Group 2  Control Group  
 
Treatment/Manipulation 
 
 
Positive manipulation of 
political trust 
 
Negative manipulation of 
political trust 
 
 
Information about the 
impact of animal 
production on climate 
change  
x x  
Hypothetical Policy 
Suggestion  
x x x 
 
A pilot study was conducted with 47 responses to ensure that the information in 
the vignette, the brief information and the questions were understandable and 
comprehensible. The pilot survey was conducted with Turkish respondents by 
using phone calling method. The participants were given a chance to make 
comments. This pretrial evaluation was also used to test whether the single-blind 
method I intent to follow was successful. Some of the volunteers who attended 
the pilot survey have been asked to try to guess why they were given especially 
these facts about the country. None of them was aware of being manipulated 
positively or negatively. This shows blinding took place successfully. For the 
actual survey, none of the pretrial evaluation volunteers was recruited since they 
could have been biased in their responses.  
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5.2.1. Policy suggestion and climate change information  
 
The hypothetical policy suggestion that was given all groups in both countries is: 
“Imagine that a climate tax is going to be imposed by the Swedish or Turkish 
(based on the country) government to decrease the meat consumption and in turn 
its harmful impact on the environment.” The brief information about the impact 
of the animal production on climate change that was provided experimental 
groups in both countries is: “Animal production is one of the largest sources of 
greenhouse gases emission (GHG) with contributions around 15% of all human 
induced GHG emissions.” 
 
5.2.2. Manipulations - Sweden 
 
A vignette is a short description of a person, object, or situation, representing a 
systematic combination of characteristics (Atzmuller & Steiner, 2010). In my 
vignettes in both countries, I have described the countries by combining some of 
their specific characteristics. For the first experimental group in Sweden, the 
vignette that was given to manipulate political trust positively was: “Sweden has 
about 10 million inhabitants. The capital city of Sweden is Stockholm. According 
to Transparency International’s ranking, Sweden is one of the least corrupt 
countries in the world.” Beside the vignette, I added an illustration that shows 
Sweden’s corruption scores between 2017 and 2019.  
 
The vignette to manipulate the political trust negatively in group 2 was: “Sweden 
has about 10 million inhabitants. The capital city of Sweden is Stockholm. 
According to Transparency International’s ranking, Sweden is the most corrupt 
country in Scandinavia and gradually losing its former top position in the 
international ranking. A recent corruption scandal, for example, is the actions of 
the Swedish company Telia in Uzbekistan.” An illustration was given to show 
Sweden’s increasing corruption level between the years of 2011 and 2019. 
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Control group has received neither a piece of information nor a vignette, but 
policy suggestion.  
 
5.2.3. Manipulations - Turkey 
 
In Turkey, the vignette to manipulate the political trust positively in group 1 was: 
“Turkey’s population reached 83 million as of end of 2019. The capital city of 
Turkey is Ankara. Corruption level in Turkey decreased gradually from 2011 to 
2013, and its score has increased.” And an illustration was given to show the 
corruption ranking between 2011 and 2013. 
 
In Turkey, the vignette to manipulate the political negatively in group 2 is: 
“Turkey’s population reached 83 million as of end of 2019. The capital city of 
Turkey is Ankara. The corruption level in Turkey has increased gradually from 
2013 until 2019 and the country has been witnessing several corruption scandals 
in its history.” And an illustration was given to show the corruption ranking 
between 2013 and 2019.” 
Control group has received neither information nor a vignette, but policy 
suggestion. 
 
5.3.  Data 
 
The data were collected in Sweden and Turkey with random sampling method in 
March and April 2020. The participants were recruited by using a mixture of 
different methods such as communicating over phone calls or using social media 
platforms to share the online surveys. The current coronavirus outbreak made 
collecting the data with face-to-face street interviews impossible. Thus, the 
surveys were shared in several different social media platforms such as Facebook 
and Twitter. Depending on the preferences of the participants, the research was 
conducted either via phone calls or online survey. The original questionnaires that 
were prepared in English were translated to Swedish for the Swedish participants 
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and to Turkish for the Turkish participants. English questionnaires were also used 
to collect data in Sweden for the English-speakers. In Turkey, only Turkish 
speakers participated in the survey. Thus, English questionnaires were not 
needed. 
 
The total number of subjects assessed for eligibility is 318 in Sweden and Turkey. 
A detailed CONSORT diagram will be represented in the section of “7. Data 
analysis and results”. 
 
In my study, I performed an analysis of variance (ANOVA) to test my hypothesis. 
By using ANOVA, I compared whether the two experiments groups and the 
control group have the same mean. The null hypothesis for the test is that the 
means of two groups are equal. Therefore, a significant result means that the two 
means are unequal. Correctly, to see whether high political trust predicts higher 
acceptability and support, I will compare the means of the groups, where I have 
positively manipulated political trust, with the control groups. And to observe if 
lower political trust causes lower acceptability and support, I will compare the 
groups, where I have manipulated political trust in a negative matter, with the 
control groups. 
 
5.4.  Experiment standards and validity  
 
For my thesis, I have prepared a checklist by taking inspiration from the reporting 
standards for experimental research prepared by The Standards Committee of the 
Experimental Research Section of the American Political Science Association in 
2014 (Gerber et al., 2014). I did not use the original reporting standards of the 
committee because all studies have their characteristics so that I have eliminated 
some parts from the original report since they were not compatible with my study. 
The purpose of the checklist is to make sure my research is meeting the necessary 
standards and whose results are assessing the validity. The criteria I intend to 
follow is shown in the figure below. 
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Figure 3. 
 
Steps to follow to assess the validity  
 
A. Hypotheses 
(see 3. Theoretical 
framework and hypotheses) 
   A specific hypothesis was given to test. 
B. Subject and Context  
(see 5.2.  Research Design: 
Survey Experiment) 
• The ways to recruit the participants were described. 
• The locations where the data were collected has been described. 
C. Allocation Method (see 
5.2.  Research Design: 
Survey Experiment) 
• Since I have used a single-blind experiment method, I have included a 
statement regarding how it was accomplished and how the success of 
blinding was evaluated. 
D. Treatments (see 5.2.  
Research Design: Survey 
Experiment) 
• A detailed description of the interventions in each treatment condition as 
well as a description of the control groups were provided. 
• Method of delivery of the surveys were described (a mixed method, sending 
out online surveys via internet and over the telephone) 
E. Results  
(see 7. Data analysis and 
results) 
In the statistical analysis report, the followings will be included: 
1) Participants flow diagram according to CONSORT statement.  
2) Statistical analysis: ANOVA 
 
In the CONSORT flow diagram, I will include the amount of the subjects 
assessed for eligibility for the study, number of subjects assigned to each 
experimental group, and number of groups analysed with the amount of excluded 
data if any. Finally, ANOVA will be performed to test my hypothesis. 
 
6. Limitations 
 
In this chapter, I introduce the limitations of this thesis. After this chapter, I will 
present the results of the data analysis. 
 
First of all, food consumption and production are certainly contingent on the 
socio-cultural, political-economic and geographic conditions in each country 
(Fesenfeld et al., 2020). While my results indicate some notable differences 
between the countries (for example, higher average acceptability and support 
levels in Sweden), I cannot fully control for the possibility that sociocultural and 
political factors could lead to different degrees of policy acceptability and 
support. 
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Second, with careful control and a random selection of the participants, my study 
reached an internal validity by making specific causal claims; however, there is a 
trade-off between internal and external validity (McDermott, 2011). Since an 
experimental setting is constructed precisely in order to be internally valid, we 
cannot be sure that the causal mechanisms hold outside the experiment (Jimenez-
Buedo & Miller, 2010; McDermott, 2011). Thus, my thesis lacks external validity 
- the generalisability of results beyond the immediate set of conditions observed. 
Besides, since the effects of the explanatory factors of public support depend on 
country context, it would not be valid to generalise with the results from two 
countries. 
 
Third, data started to be collected after the COVID-19 outbreak. The conditions 
caused by the outbreak might have affected the participants’ attitudes for 
supporting an environmental policy either way, positively or negatively. For 
instance, at the beginning of the pandemic, Sweden’s strategy for handling the 
coronavirus was deviating from other countries. Thus, Sweden’s approach about 
the pandemic might have affected the participants’ trust in government, in turn, 
their responses for the survey. Moreover, in Sweden, a petition signed more than 
2,000 doctors, scientists and professors in March 2020 called on the government 
to introduce more stringent containment measures (Robertson, 2020). It shows 
clear opposition to the actions of the government. This might have affected the 
confidence level of people those have more trust in scientists than the 
government. On the other hand, it has recommended to avoid unprotected contact 
with farm or wild animals (WHO, 2020). This might also have affected the public 
support and policy acceptability of a tax on meat consumption. 
 
In Turkey, supermarket shelves were quickly stripped bare of staple foods and 
essential products after the Health Ministry announced the virus had reached. 
After a couple of weeks, a two days curfew was announced without any advance 
notice, so that the panic led people to go out and stock even more. Thus, this 
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might have affected the generalised or institutional trust level of the participants, 
in turn, the results of the survey. To sum up, the participants’ attitudes who were 
surveyed during and after the outbreak might have been affected either way by 
the chaotic and uncertain environment COVID-19 created. 
 
7. Data analysis and result 
 
In this chapter, I present the experimental flow diagram according to CONSORT 
by including general characteristics of the subjects. After the diagram, I present 
the results of ANOVA for Turkey and Sweden. 
 
The total number of respondents is 318. In total, there are six different groups. In 
Sweden, two of the total three different groups are experiment groups where I 
manipulated the political trust in a negative (n=64) and positive manner (n=58), 
and the third and last one is control group (n=48) with no manipulation. In 
Turkey, the number of participants of the experiment group 1 with negative 
manipulation is 45, the experiment group 2 with positive manipulation is 46, and 
the control group is 54 (figure 4). 
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Figure 4. CONSORT 2010 Flow Diagram  
Excluded (n=0)
Randomized (n=170)
Experimental group 2 (n=58) 
*Manipulating the political 
trust in a positive manner
Experimental group 1 (n=64) 
*Manipulating the political 
trust in a negative manner
Control group (n=48) 
*No manipulation
Assessed for eligibility (n=170)
Excluded (n=0) Excluded (n=0) Excluded (n=0)
Analysed (n=64) Analysed (n=58) Analysed (n=48)
Analysis
Follow-Up
Allocation
Enrollment
Sweden
Excluded (n=0)
Randomized (n=148)
Experimental group 2 (n=46) 
*Manipulating the political 
trust in a positive manner
Experimental group 1 (n=48) 
*Manipulating the political 
trust in a negative manner
Control group (n=54) 
*No manipulation
Assessed for eligibility (n=148)
Excluded (n=0) Excluded (n=0) Excluded (n=0)
Analysed (n=48) Analysed (n=46) Analysed (n=54)
Analysis
Follow-Up
Allocation
Enrollment
Turkey
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7.1. Results for Turkey  
 
The test results of ANOVA for Turkey are presented in table 1 and 2. Table 1 
shows the mean levels of how respondents in three different groups are willing to 
support the climate tax on meat consumption by accepting to bear some costs 
resulting from the policy. The group where political trust was manipulated 
negatively report the lowest level of public support for a hypothetical meat tax in 
Turkey (mean=0.29). The control group which did not receive any treatment 
report a higher level of support for a climate tax on meat consumption than the 
group that received negative manipulation (mean=0.48). Lastly, the group where 
political trust was manipulated positively report the highest level of support for 
the mentioned tax (mean=.67) that is in line with my hypothesis - H1a. This 
means that the higher political trust people have in Turkey, the more likely to 
support the climate tax on meat consumption.  
 
In the second part of table 1, the results show that the group mean where political 
trust is manipulated in a positive manner (mean= 3.07) is higher than the control 
group mean (mean=2.76). It means that people in the group where political trust 
was manipulated positively are more likely to find the policy acceptable than the 
people who did not receive any manipulation or receive a negative manipulation. 
This does support the second part of my hypothesis – H1b - the higher political 
trust people have, the more likely they are to accept a climate tax on meat 
consumption. 
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Table 1 Descriptive statistics of willingness to bear some costs by experiment 
groups  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Policy acceptability - How acceptable do you find the hypothetical policy proposal given above? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In the first part of table 2, where political support is the dependent variable, shows 
that there is a shred of strong evidence against the null hypothesis, as there is less 
than a 5% chance the null is correct. Therefore, the result rejects the null 
hypothesis and shows that there is a significant difference between some of the 
group’s means. However, in the second part, where policy acceptability is the 
dependent variable, the significance level is greater than the p-value (0.05). Thus, 
I cannot conclude that a significant difference between the group means exists. 
 
 
 
  
Descriptives 
Public support - Are you willing to bear some costs resulting from the policy to decrease the 
meat consumption, in turn, GHG emission? Would you vote in favour of such a policy? 
 
 
 
 
Groups N Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Std. 
Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
for Mean 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Positive manipulation  
 
46 .67 .474 .070 .53 .81 
Control  
 
54 .48 .504 .069 .34 .62 
Negative manipulation  
 
48 .29 .459 .066 .16 .43 
Total 148 .48 .501 .041 .40 .56 
Positive manipulation  
 
46 3.07 1.254 .185 2.69 3.44 
Control  
 
54 2.76 1.359 .185 2.39 3.13 
Negative manipulation  
 
48 2.94 1.311 .189 2.56 3.32 
Total 148 2.91 1.309 .108 2.70 3.12 
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Table 2 ANOVA 
ANOVA 
Public support – Are you willing to bear some costs resulting from the policy to decrease the meat 
consumption, in turn, GHG? Would you vote in favour of such a policy? 
 
Sum of  
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between Groups 3.432 2 1.716 7.427 .001 
Within Groups 33.507 145 .231   
Total 36.939 147    
      
Policy acceptability - How acceptable do you find the hypothetical policy proposal given above? 
 
Between Groups 2.371 2 1.185 .689 .504 
Within Groups  249.487 145 1.721   
Total 251.858 147    
      
 
7.2. Results for Sweden  
 
The test results of ANOVA for Sweden are presented in table 3 and 4. The results 
for Sweden and Turkey have similar patterns regarding the effect of positive 
manipulation. In Sweden, like in Turkey, the group where political trust was 
manipulated positively report the highest level of support for the mentioned tax 
(mean=.66) that is in line with my hypothesis - H1a. This means that the higher 
political trust people have in Sweden, the more likely to support the climate tax 
on meat consumption. And the group where political trust was negatively 
manipulated report the lowest level of public support for a hypothetical meat tax 
in Sweden (mean=0.33). 
 
In the second part of table 4 where policy acceptability is the dependent variable, 
the positive manipulation group mean (mean= 3.45) is higher than the control 
group mean (mean=2.88) and the negative manipulation group mean 
(mean=2.95). This also supports the second part of my hypothesis – H1b - the 
higher political trust people have, the more likely they are to accept a climate tax 
on meat consumption. 
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Table 3 Descriptive statistics of willingness to bear some costs by experiment 
groups  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Policy acceptability - How acceptable do you find the hypothetical policy proposal given above? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4 reveals that the exact significance between the groups means is .001 
when public support is the dependent variable, and .042 when policy 
acceptability is the dependent variable. So, we know that there is a significant 
difference between the means of these groups. 
 
  
Descriptives 
Public support - Are you willing to bear some costs resulting from the policy to decrease the 
meat consumption, in turn, GHG emission? Would you vote in favour of such a policy? 
 
 
 
 
Groups N Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Std. 
Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
for Mean 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Positive manipulation  
 
58 .66 .479 .063 .53 .78 
Control  
 
48 .52 .505 .073 .37 .67 
Negative manipulation  
 
64 .33 .473 .059 .21 .45 
Total 170 .49 .501 .038 .42 .57 
Positive manipulation  
 
58 3.45 1.187 .156 3.14 3.76 
Control  
 
48 2.88 1.265 .183 2.51 3.24 
Negative manipulation  
 
64 2.95 1.408 .176 2.60 3.30 
Total 170 3.10 1.313 .101 2.90 3.30 
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Table 4 ANOVA 
ANOVA 
Public support – Are you willing to bear some costs resulting from the policy to decrease the meat 
consumption, in turn, GHG? Would you vote in favour of such a policy? 
 
Sum of  
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between Groups 3.302 2 1.651 7.035 .001 
Within Groups 39.192 167 .235   
Total 42.494 169    
      
Policy acceptability - How acceptable do you find the hypothetical policy proposal given above? 
 
Between Groups 10.846 2 5.423 3.229 .042 
Within Groups 280.454 167 1.679   
Total 291.300 169    
 
To sum up, the results are in line with my hypothesis. The pattern between 
political trust and policy acceptability and public support is the same in both 
countries regardless of their corruption level. Furthermore, participants are 
seemed to interpret the two public attitudes types differently. The lower level of 
political trust does not seem to have the same influence on policy acceptability 
and support. While a low level of political trust has a negative impact on public 
support, the same effect could not be found on policy acceptability.   
 
Lastly, a randomisation control (Appendix 1) was conducted in ANOVA by 
inserting all the independent variables individually while the groups were inserted 
as the dependent variable. The reason for the test was to see whether the variation 
among group means was higher than expected to occur by chance. If the F ratio 
is a large number, it means that random sampling happened to end up with large 
values in some groups and small values in others. For instance, according to the 
findings of the present survey, when the public support is independent, and the 
groups are dependent variables, the F ratio value is high. Thus, we can conclude 
that the participants were affected by the manipulation itself, and the results were 
not attributed by chance. 
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8. Discussion and conclusion 
 
To date, the study focused on the environmental impact caused by the food sector 
and assessing how these impacts can be reduced through a change in consumers 
diet by taxing meat consumption. Research on political feasibility and gaining 
public support for the policy interventions to reduce the environmental impact of 
the food system is still scarce. This study examines the role of political trust on 
public support and policy acceptability for a climate tax on meat consumption in 
Turkey and Sweden.  
 
By using an experimental method, I show that it is possible to draw a cause-effect 
relationship between political trust and public support/ acceptability for this 
hypothetical meat tax. According to the data results, in both countries, regardless 
of their corruption levels, higher political trust causes higher public support/ 
acceptability for such policy. I identify the effect of political trust in two different 
countries, suggesting that efforts on increasing political trust might be an 
opportunity to reduce the potential public opposition for environmental taxes.  
My results do support the existing research that finds political trust has a positive 
influence on public support for environmental taxes (Davidovic et al., 2019; 
Hammar & Jagers, 2006). As different from the existing literature, I have 
conducted an experiment by using manipulations and revealed that higher 
political trust brings higher support/ acceptability in both countries.  
 
I conclude with some suggestions for further research. I cannot fully ensure that 
respondents perfectly represent the population in Turkey and Sweden. Also, my 
thesis lack external validity - the generalisability of results beyond the immediate 
set of conditions observed. Generalising with the results from the two countries 
would not be valid. Further research might complement the external validity of 
my finding across different countries or issues. Since the food consumption and 
production is entirely contingent on cultural, political, economic and geographic 
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conditions, field experiments across countries can be more valid and give us a 
chance to interpret the results accordingly.  
 
Besides that, I conducted the experiment about a meat tax, not a specific type of 
meat or fish. Further studies could explore whether support and acceptability 
changes depending on the people’s perception of some animal products as good 
for health (e.g. sea products). Furthermore, meat consumption issue is approached 
from the animal welfare perspective. Further studies can also study whether 
public support for a climate tax on meat consumption varies amongst these 
perspectives. 
 
Additionally, I recommend further studies to focus on the understanding of 
differences of public attitudes towards state interventions. In my study, policy 
acceptability and public support are found to be interpreted differently by the 
public. Future studies can elaborate on this differentiation.  
 
Finally, I have only tested the effect of political trust on public support for a meat 
tax, so further studies might involve other explanatory factors behind the support 
into their research to see the correlation between the factors.  
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Appendix 1  
 
Table 5 Randomisation control 
 
 F Sig. 
Public support 14.956 .000 
Policy acceptability .565 .688 
Education 1.570 .212 
Gender .081 .922 
Age .231 .875 
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Appendix 2 Survey experiment – Turkey 
 
a) Positive manipulation group 
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b) Negative manipulation group  
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c) Control group  
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Appendix 3 Survey experiment – Sweden 
 
a) Positive manipulation group  
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b) Negative manipulation group  
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c) Control group  
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Appendix 4 Questions for all groups  
 
